A b s t r a c t. The article focuses on the hermeneutics of conversation. Its aim is to demonstrate the nature of a hermeneutic conversation as triggering a true possibility of understanding. I propose to see silence, epiphany and conversion, with its irreducible character, as significant components of a hermeneutic conversation. Thus conceived conversation leads to an unveiling of the unknown and generates a genuine possibility of an encounter between the self and the Other. The encounter rests on two indispensable attributes: reciprocity and trust. A genuine conversation in the hermeneutic sense, propelled by these two constituents, exerts a cathartic, transformative and formative power. Not only does it lead to understanding in which the speaking partners are involved, but it entails a potent unearthing of the self, a discovery of one's identity. This study is based on Hans-Georg Gadamer's premise of the universal character of understanding. Gadamer's hermeneutics regards understanding as the fundamental category of our being-in-the-world. The article illustrates the workings of the hermeneutic conversation with an analysis of J. Joyce's "The Dead."
The genuine conversation, in the hermeneutic sense, comprises indispensably two attributes: reciprocity and trust. Significantly, the double-fold nature of the hermeneutic conversation presupposes a true interchange of thoughts and feelings, which is destined, not so much to enlighten intellectually the two parties involved, though this is also part of the conversational design, but more importantly and profoundly, to bequeath the speaking parties with mutual understanding. The possibility of understanding goes beyond the plainness of the message imbued in the uttered words, but it un-MAŁGORZATA HOŁDA, PhD-Philosophy Department, The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow; address for correspondence: ul. Kanonicza 25, earths an occasion of a true encounter of the self and the Other. Such a paradigm of conversation implies an understanding shared by interlocutors, in which the intermingling moments of taciturnity, disclosure and alteration play important roles not only to the effect of a redefinition of the goalposts, but to the phenomenological attunement of the self to the Other in their respective otherness. The aim of my article is to trace the hermeneutic aspect of conversation and to point to silence, epiphany and conversion as viable components of a genuine conversation, which not only entail a gradual unfolding of meaning, but most significantly spark off an unfathomable possibility of understanding. The study is based on Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics and his assertion of understanding as the rudimentary mode of our being in the world.
In an explication of the workings of the hermeneutic conversation as a quest for understanding, I propose to view St. Anselm's principle fides quaerens intellect as that which the genuine conversation follows. St. Anselm's philosophical standpoint in a literal translation denotes: "faith seeking understanding." For St. Anselm faith is prior to religion in the sense that the understanding of the theological matters must be preceded by a belief in them (Grenz, Guretzki & Nordling 52). Such a rendition of the relationship between human reason and religious faith may be treated as constitutive of the model for the hermeneutic conversation. The presupposition of understanding, or more accurately, the faith that understanding is feasible, tied with the trust in the Other, precedes an encounter in conversation between the self and the Other, and reflects Anselm's paradigm. There must be some mutual trust of the self in the Other which causes that understanding actually does happen. I attempt to show that the three components of the hermeneutic conversation mentioned above: silence, epiphany and conversion contribute to a gradual evolvement of understanding. Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, the two hermeneutic icons, agree on the validity of understanding as the fundamental mode of human existence. Francis J. Mootz III, George H. Taylor stress in Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics that the two thinkers "…regard understanding as the basic posture of human" and explain further that "We engage in dialogue with other to allow their being to unfold. We try to allow the world around us to speak. Understanding is our primary means of participation in, and belonging to, the world" (1).
Understanding as a tangible mode of intelligibility in the world, calls for and necessitates silence to become part of a hermeneutic conversation. Si-lence from an anthropological, but, equally importantly, from the semiotic perspective can be understood as the space by means of which human expresses his/her primordial sense of existence and an experience of life. Silence amounts to an irreplaceable gesture, through which the self can convey meaning when words do not suffice, when utterance, no matter how profound, is always inappropriate, or even more precariously, it would impair the delicacy of the message instilled. Worse still, an awkwardness of words may completely destroy the relation between the self and the Other. This situation is succinctly expressed in Ludwig Wittgenstein's famous statement: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (115). The insufficiency of speech is especially true in case of trauma, both, for the self who suffers from a traumatic experience, attempting to confess the burden of it, and for the listener/interlocutor. The limitedness of the verbal correspondence between the self and the Other needs a different mode of expression. Silence speaks when words cease to have any kind of force to articulate the unspeakable. To put it in a different way, the powerlessness of the verbal communication in trauma deconstructs the potentiality of communication as such, and thus disarms the self in its need for a profound exteriorization. The uttermost failure to respond, to meet the requirement of an effective communication results in silence, but this does not mean that the inexpressible is incapable of finding a possibility of understanding, leads to inertia, or remains unaltered. On the contrary, silence opens up a space for an encounter with the Other, not less significant or effectual than an encounter which is achieved by and in words. Thus, silence is not a collapse in conversation, but a heightened possibility of understanding in its unadulterated form.
For the sake of examining the formative power of silence, it is worth to consider two kinds of silence: silence as an impasse in conversation, and silence which stems from an involuntary cessation of the bondage between the interlocutors due to death or a long discontinuity in conversation.
The first kind of silence which I intend to tackle here is as an impasse in conversation or a strategy of withdrawal. In the moment of silence, the flimsiness of the barrier between the self and the Other, particularly in an intimate conversation regarding a traumatic experience gains a special status. The boundary is almost non-existent and the distance comes to a seeming end, as the self and the Other are confronted with a tangible possibility to fulfill the existential demand of understanding and being understood. Understanding through silence is entangled with ethics. The ethical factor may comprise modesty, a mild form of relinquishing your 'self', or a total resig-nation from the 'self.' Isn't it more often than not that something which for the self means the out-and-out world, purely does not exist in the world of the Other. The clash, then, is constitutive of the uttermost alteration of the horizons delimiting the zones of comprehension. If understanding is achieved, it has the quality of entirety, or, dramatically, it is none. There is an ontological query here. The binary opposition of being and nothingness is exceptionally acute. Silence is an instantaneous gesture of interpolation, displayed whilst conversion is soon resumed. Its suddenness is unforeseeable, silence interrupts conversation at a point with a momentous consequence.
Undoubtedly, silence appears when conversation comes to a critical point, a climax, in which the self and the Other are not capable of locating deliverance. However, silence is not a void, but rather it takes on the quality of passion, a magnified and utterly heightened form of conversation.
The other kind of silence which I endeavor to examine is the termination of conversation and the resultant silence which is long in terms of a passage of time. It may be the span of many years of no words being uttered for some existential reason, like, for instance, in the situation of losing a track of the Other in the wake of war, or, as a result of some severe gap, arising from a strenuous decision to quit conversation. The long separation between the moment of the last word and the next may invoke the most extreme longing, yet, also, the ultimate impossibility of expression. The uttermost force of silence manifests itself in case of death and the impossibility of continuing the conversation with the Other. The conversation seems to be relinquished forever, and yet, the question arises if it is really so? The absence of the other is paradoxically a mode of presence. The profundity of the schism between the self and the dead Other generates a bizarre and inexplicable possibility of conversation. The self speaks to the dead Other and there is no response, or there is a response similar to the voice of conscience.
Silence in the face of death posits a special problematic. The self is overwhelmingly perturbed, fearing the death of the Other. The silence evoked by death magnifies the fear of death, but, on the other hand, it paradoxically, annuls the self's own fear of death, since death means a recuperated unity with the Other. Silence, then, in the hermeneutic conversation with the dead Other serves both as a formative and transformative propensity. The 'self' transgresses the boundary between its fear of death and the fear of the death of the Other. For Heidegger, the feeling of dread of death is the most rudimentary indication of the nature of Nothing. The dread of death, of nothingness is a ubiquitous trait of human existence and human experience. Our being-there, Dasein is constantly laid open to uncertainty and our lives seem to be shaped by death (Heidegger 2: 27, 3: 32) . In the light of Heidegger's reckoning of the dread of death as the primordial characteristic of our existence, silence, epitomizing the breakage of the conversational bondage between the self and the Other, can be interpreted as the stupendous hiatus that impedes the continuity of the hermeneutic conversation, and paradoxically, it can be also understood as a viable possibility of the presence of the Other, shaping the wordless hermeneutic conversation in a way similar to that which happens between the voice of the self and the voice of conscience conversing in me.
To illustrate the second type of silence and what it entails in the hermeneutic, anthropological and the psychological sense, let me resort to an instance from a work of fiction, which renders it in an intriguing and powerful fashion. James Joyce's short story "The Dead" (1914), the last and the greatest in his famous collection Dubliners, demonstrates the hermeneutics of conversation, the redeeming force of conversation as accompanied by the formative function of silence. One of the reasons for the selection of the text of Joyce' s story is that it might be viewed as a distant, unconscious intertextual echo of Schleiermacher's Christmas Eve (1806) in the reverse. Schleiermacher depicts the movement from the solemnity of the theological debate to the gaiety of the Christmas gathering of people who become personally engaged in the celebration of the miracle of nativity as a community expressing their emotions. Joyce moves from the merrymaking and the splendid sharing of the spirit of community, the laughter and the twists and turns of the shrewd ripostes to the zone of intimacy and retreat, in which the self rediscovers itself in the personal conversation with the Other and with oneself. Joyce offers a multi-layered scene of conversation, in which the revelation of truth deeply affects the speaker, but even more overwhelmingly the listener in the presence of yet another Other-the dead Other. For the former, giving a soul to the Other, in an act of conversation means a total release, a redemption of the burdened self, for the listener, it signifies a totality of the unexpected truth, which poses a viable possibility of uncovering one's own identity and giving an answer to the question of 'who am I?'
Let me just give a brief synopsis of the story's events which are necessary for an explication of the hermeneutics of conversation and the transformative power of both conversation and silence. The protagonists, Gabriel and his wife Greta come back to a hotel after a joyful family gathering at Christmas. The departure is, however, preceded by an episode of crucial importance. Gabriel sees his wife engrossed while she is listening to a song. Greta un-dergoes a sudden upsurge of feelings, she recalls her former lover, a young boy, Michael, who died many years ago for her. It is not until the spouses enter the hotel room that Greta out of the sudden reveals to her husband the truth about the romantic liaison she had in the past. Now the past returns to her. Interestingly, the arousal of sexual desire for his wife in Gabriel in a moment of privacy in the hotel is now powerfully juxtaposed with Greta's unexpected confession of the young love. For Greta it is a restoration of the conversation with the dead lover. In the weirdest fashion, Gabriel participates in the interplay between the past and the present, his wife being soon asleep, he imagines the phantom of Michael and appears to enter the space of the conversation between Greta and her young lover which was terminated years ago. Oddly enough, now, his consciousness speaks to the dead Other, as if continuing the conversation between his wife and Michael, his soul being reflected in the other lover, while she is immersed in the state of being dead to the world, soon asleep. Is this the conversation with oneself (Sililoquium) or is it the conversation with the dead Other? Or both?
The monstrosity, but also the grandiose of the scene lies in an ironic twist, with Gabriel recognizing himself as a fool. From the structural point of view, it seems clear that he is both a listener to Greta's confession and an interlocutor with her past. The internalization of the voice of the Other is marked by features similar to those characteristic for a reading process described by Poulet. Interestingly, Gabriel is not only a partner in communication, but becomes an unreliable narrator and a reader of his own narrative, following the lines of a seeming participation in the phenomenological process of 'reading' according to Poulet: "Whatever I think is a part of my mental world. And yet I am thinking a thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world, which is being thought in me just as though I did not exist. Already the notion is inconceivable and seems even more so if I reflect that, since every thought must have a subject to think it, this thought which is alien to me and yet in me, must also have subject which is alien to me …" (54).
The major part of the scene in the hotel room happens in Gabriel's consciousness. It is the multiplicity of the interweaving paths of the 'self' speaking to the Other, mirrored in yet another self. The multi-layered conversation between the self and the Other affects yet another interlocutor-the reader of Joyce's story. The melting of the horizons, which concerns the intricacies of the conversation between the spouses and the dead Other, happens within the narrative, but it also encompasses the conversation in the sense of Wolfgang Iser's conceptualization of the reading process, as the melting of the horizons of the text and the reader (188). The conversation exerts both a cathartic and transformative influence on Gabriel, but not less significantly on the reader of the story.
Being on the tenterhooks of not unearthing her troubled soul, in a sudden outburst, Greta transgresses the barrier between her 'self' and the Other. The dynamics of the conversation presupposes and involves an inevitable change. Greta's confession, her surrendering herself to the Other-her husband, not only resumes the conversation which came to an abrupt end due to death of the beloved Other, bur entails a radical change and opens her to a possibility of speaking to the Other. Gabriel's speaking to the Other, to his wife and most astoundingly to the dead lover, sparks off a crushing experience. The ferocious conversion between the spouses coupled with the tenderness of the subject matter enables Gabriel to reevaluate his life in the light of it. In a moment of epiphany, he recognizes his acute inability to love; moved and roused, he apprehends his clownishness and a collapse of the self. However, the collapse is followed by a rediscovery of the self, the tremulous self, which is soon soothed by nature. In the story's finale, the snow falling down on both the living and the dead gains a symbolic quality of unifying the living self and the dead Other; the unsteady equilibrium comes to an end.
The hermeneutic conversation pre-conditions and calls for an awakening of a response in and from the Other. In Truth and Method H.G. Gadamer writes: "We say that we "conduct" a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved it" (385). The structure, texture and nature of a dialogue are such that the initial and the subtlest aspects of the yet unspoken undergo the processes of figuration and refiguration before the disclosure actually occurs. The message constitutes itself via a transit from the blurred and inconsistent to the ordered and coherent and allows for a meaningful convergence of the horizons of the speaking partners in the Gadamerian sense of the hermeneutic conversation. The workings of the hermeneutic conversation can be also compared to Husserl's depiction of our consciousness of time: "Every originally constructive process is inspired by pre-intentions, which construct and collect the seed of what is to come, as such, and bring it to fruition" (52). The genuine hermeneutic conversation activates all of the intellectual and emotional faculties that we have at our disposal, the conscious and the subconscious in order to enable us to recreate and more significantly to create the world of ours, the understanding of each other. It is not purely a linguistic process, including an abundance of inevitable omissions, stratagems, evasions, necessary and unnecessary repetitions, hesitations, revelations and concealments etc., but it is a phenomenological process entailing a concurrent creating and dismantling of the understanding, which potentially can always disturb or put at ease. The hermeneutic conversation allows for the stripping away of the camouflaging techniques the self and the Other may possibly deploy and prepares the ground for a translucent comprehension of one another. The sometimes deflective and selective processes of making and remaking of what is being uttered in a face-to-face milieu, collaborate to the effect of the ultimate reaching of understanding. The reorganizational power of a genuine hermeneutic conversation bespeaks its penchant for the fettering of all the barriers arising on the way of the primordial experience of understanding, its innate nature being bestowed in us human beings.
The dynamic character of the hermeneutic conversation is steered by the intermingling silences, epiphanies and conversions. Inasmuch as silence breaks the continuum of the conversation in an unexpected fashion, so does epiphany with its essential prerequisite of suddenness destroy the division between the known and the unknown and contributes to the dynamism of conversation. The unforeseeable realization of some truth opens a path for an absorption of otherness and there comes to a unique encounter between the self and the Other. In Joyce's story, the sudden truth regarding Gabriel's foolishness and a disability of love daunts on him. Thinking the thoughts of the Other in the speechless part of the dialogue with both his wife and her dead lover, he recedes in his own self in order to regain it anew in the process of maturation. Epiphany, being "a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether from some object, scene, event, or memorable phase of the mind-the manifestation being out of proportion to the significance or strictly logical relevance of whatever produces it" (Beja, 18) becomes part of a dialogue in the very transit from the unfamiliar to the familiar; the transit happens instantaneously. The meaning of epiphany in literature has a lot to offer to unveil the processes of a hermeneutic conversation, since a literary context is not self-restrictive, but participates in the intertextual networking of the cultural codes inimitable both in life experiences and literary imaginings.
Another significant reference regarding the role of epiphany in molding conversation, which cannot be omitted here, is Emmanuel Levinas's con-ceptualization of the epiphany of face and its inextricable bondage with conversation. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes:
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of Infinity. But this also means to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced. (51) This brief and extremely capacious explication of the encounter with the Other and with Infinity in conversation by Levinas manifests the double-fold character of such an encounter: the transgression of the 'I'-that means the form of 'being' which is beyond the limitations of the 'I,' and which signifies concomitantly an openness to Infinity, and the second facet-teaching and being taught. What does 'teaching' mean? In the hermeneutic conversation, teaching constitutes the unveiling of some concealed truth and here the truth is the truth of the Other and about the Other, 'The epiphany of the face is produced' in a non-violent recognition of the very otherness of the Other which the hermeneutic conversation facilitates.
The active role of epiphany in the hermeneutic conversation lies also in the fact that it is inseparable with conversion. The need to understand propels our capacity of understanding, and as a matter of fact, conversion, which goes side by side with epiphany, is sparked off by the very need to decipher, to formulate and reformulate, not so much as a conscious act, but as the rudimentary, subliminal incentive to unearth that which calls for a discovery in the process of my maturation as a person. Conversion goes beyond the superficiality of learning the novelty, but constitutes a real disclosure of what previously has been banned from my consciousness. In its inevitable character, it constitutes the very heart of the hermeneutic conversation. Conversion crashes the tentative barrier between the self which is unknown to me, the 'self' which I have not understood yet. The borderline between the undiscovered 'I' and the ''I' becomes a unique point of convergence as what is novel is instantaneously assimilated and causes a true alteration of the self. Conversion in the hermeneutic conversation has the quality of catharsis; it does not allow to consign an emotional or spiritual query to the unconscious, but, on the contrary it opens a path for its cleansing and reshaping.
The conversion which happens in a face-to-face conversation cannot be compared to any other conversion in personality which occurs as a result of some life experience. Conversion in the hermeneutic conversation in not a clichéd form of achieving alteration in human character, but it necessitates the inimitable circularity of the search of the self. I am seeking my identity, but I am already the self which is searched for. Conversion pertains to the dialectics of personal identity. Conversion testifies to and accords with the findings of Paul Ricoeur's reflection on the nuances of the formation of the narrative identity. Ricoeur holds that "To say self is not to say myself . . . the passage from selfhood to mineness is marked by the clause "in each case" . . . The self . . . is in each case mine" (180). The phrase "in each case" is of fundamental import, as the discovery of some facet of one's identity calls for attestation. There is this inherent need for me to take my selfhood as mine in each particular case of revelation and the ensuing conversion. The quest for understanding is the quest for identity, which is a potent challenge, the 'self' ventures into the terrain of a struggle of seeking and finding. Conversion concerns one's identity, but equally powerfully it also concerns the social and ethical domains of the parties involved in conversation. The entanglement of the speaking partners in a true hermeneutic conversation does not constitute a mere assemblage of various voices and a simplistic participation in an intellectual game of the 'rates of exchange,' but it involves a genuine conversion of the partners as members of a community, partners who can learn from each other, practice thoughtful resourcefulness, openness and attunement to the otherness of the Other. Conversion means here an abandonment of the stiff, one-sided thinking and the abolition of the vacillating borders between the partners to the effect of sharing the joy of an intellectual, emotional and spiritual encounter.
The possibility and irreducibility of conversion arise from our indebtedness to the Other. Our sharing and openness to conversion stem from the primordial gesture of friendship and justice bestowed in us. Ricoeur recognizes the spark or the gift of sharing and names it using the term "benevolent spontaneity" (190) . The power of conversion, its irreducible force lies in its ontological status, the self is predisposed to crash discrepancies and delimit any impositions of difference.
In conclusion, I would like to accentuate that the three analyzed components of the hermeneutic conversation: silence, epiphany and conversion, playing respective roles in the process of understanding, involve a tint of suffering, not in the sense of a harmful experience but in the sense of the subliminal shade of a loss, more to the effect implied in George Bernard Shaw's statement: "You have learnt something. That always feels at first as if you had lost something" (316). The hermeneutic conversation entails a true giving of oneself to the Other as a gift, with all of our capabilities and incapabilities, much in the manner Ricoeur indicates: "from the suffering Other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn from the power of acting and existing, but precisely from weakness itself" (188). Therefore, even if acting is not a palpable possibility, in the hermeneutic conversation, giving is always feasible; giving here rests on the knowledge of being as a vulnerable human being, giving is the sharing of this pre-disposition to frailty and defenselessness, and the feeling of "benevolence" needed to endure in the face of this knowledge. The hermeneutic conversation is the enduring love of the Other.
